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THE IMF AND AGOA: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONALITY
INTRODUCTION
The International Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund) and the
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are fundamentally dissimilar regimes with different purposes and goals. The mission of the
IMF is to monitor and stabilize the global economic currency system.1
It is a member-based organization of nation-states that provides loans
to countries in financial difficulties. AGOA, on the other hand, is a
unilateral trade preference regime offered by the U.S. government to
benefit countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Its purpose is to provide increased trade opportunities as an incentive for countries to undertake
political and economic reforms.2
A common feature of the IMF and AGOA is, however, that both
institutions impose conditions on their beneficiaries. “Conditionality” in relations between developed and developing countries, specifically with regard to financial assistance and trade benefits, has
long been a highly controversial topic. Condemnation of IMF conditionality has become something of an ethos among critics of the
Fund.3 Along those lines, there have also been numerous complaints
regarding the conditionality engrained in AGOA.4

1. See generally Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945,
art. I, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 40 (as amended by the Second Amendment to the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, art. I, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 2205, 15
I.L.M. 546, 547 (1976)) [hereinafter IMF Articles]. The text of the Second Amendment reprints
the IMF Articles with all changes incorporated into the body of the full text. But see Third
Amendment of the Articles of Agreement Regarding the Suspension of Voting Rights, June 28,
1990, 31 I.L.M. 1307 (1992) (amending Article XII, § 3(i), and Article XXVI, § 2, and adding
Schedule L and paragraph 5 of Schedule D). Hereinafter, citations to the IMF Articles will be
to the printed sources for either the Second or Third Amendments as necessary. The current
full text is also available from the IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/aa/index.htm and http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf (last visited Mar. 28,
2004).
2. See discussion infra in Part II.
3. See, e.g., Vivien Collingwood, Assistance with Fewer Strings Attached, in ETHICS &
INT'L AFF., No. 1, at 55 (Carnegie Couns. Ethics & Int'l Aff. 2003) (critiquing IMF conditionality); Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 20 ("The IMF's
recent emphasis on imposing major structural and institutional reforms as opposed to focusing
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This note analyzes the manner in which conditions are applied in
the IMF and AGOA regimes. While the substance of the conditions
is naturally dissimilar, we explicitly accept the premise that conditions
have the potential to be an important tool in effecting positive change
by influencing recipient country policies. Thus, affirming the theoretical legitimacy of conditionality, the paper undertakes an analysis
of how the IMF and AGOA use the conditions at their disposal, and
whether such use is consistent with their missions and purposes.
I. DECONSTRUCTING ARGENTINA’S FAILURE
If success has a thousand fathers, then Argentina has lately been
an orphan. Merely six years ago, Argentina was the darling of the
IMF,5 and the country’s leaders bragged of the macroeconomic
“miracle” that had transpired following the “lost decade” of the
1980s.6 Since its default in December of 2001, the struggling nation
has seen massive capital flight, followed by an inevitable influx of crit7
ics.

on balance-of-payments adjustments will have adverse consequences in both the short term and
the more distant future.").
4. See, e.g., Jesse Jackson, Jr., Hope for Africa, NATION, Mar. 15, 1999, at 6 (arguing that
AGOA "impose[s] on Africa the worst aspects of the International Monetary Fund's structural
adjustment programs, major elements of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization, and leftover provisions of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, while proffering illusive, shortlived trade 'benefits'"); see also Chakravarthi Raghavan, Africa: NGOs start campaign against
U.S. AGOA, THIRD WORLD NETWORK ONLINE, (Oct. 4, 2000) (reporting on African civil society groups’ claims that AGOA “provides illusory benefits to African countries who in exchange
are to provide real concessions to the United States and its firms"), at www.twnside.org.sg/
title/agoa.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
5. See MICHAEL MUSSA, ARGENTINA & THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY 1–2
(2002); see also Bretton Woods Committee, Spotlight on Latin America, in CRITICAL ISSUES
FORUM, Dec. 2002, at 5 (comments of Joseph Stiglitz, referring to Argentina as the "A-plus
student of the IMF"), at http://www.brettonwoods.org/Critical%20Issues%20Latin%20
America.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
6. See Domingo F. Cavallo & Joaquin A. Cottani, Argentina's Convertibility Plan and the
IMF, AM. ECON. REV., May 1997, at 17.
7. See, e.g., Bretton Woods Committee, supra note 5, at 6–7 (comments of Adam Lerrick,
blaming Argentina's malaise on populist social sentiment, strong labor unions, and big spending). See also id. at 8 (comments of Morris Goldstein: "Argentina got into trouble because it
didn't exercise sufficient fiscal discipline . . . because it allowed its external debt to become too
large, because it stuck too long with a currency regime that permitted its real exchange rate to
become uncompetitive, and because it refused for too long to restructure its debt . . ."); Mary
Anastasia O'Grady, A Shocking Proposal: Let Brazil Find its Own Way, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,
2002, at A13 ("[R]igid [Argentine] labor laws and protectionism were destroying productivity
and high taxes were choking off incentives to invest and produce."); James Petras, The Case of
Argentina, SOCIAL POLICY, Summer 2002, at 6–7 ("The principle cause for decline and collapse
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Given its history of providing significant financial and political
support for Argentina’s economic policies during the 1990s, the IMF
has unsurprisingly found itself to be the object of much of the criticism. Left-wing commentators assail the IMF for focusing on neoliberal economics while ignoring the increasingly stratified distribution of wealth between rich and poor.8 Predictably, conservatives
take the opposite approach, blaming the IMF for allowing Argentina’s leaders to delay the implementation of “sound money, low tax
rates and freer trade policy.”9 Critics on both sides of the political
spectrum have called for the IMF to “shut down.”10
Of course, the collapse of an entire economy is unlikely to stem
from a single factor, meaning that all of the above commentators are
at least partially correct. But much of the literature emerging over
the past two years has overemphasized Argentina’s fiscal, monetary,
and exchange policy instead of addressing the fundamental problems
that have led Argentina from one financial crisis to another for decades. In particular, we believe that Argentina will never achieve
long-term growth and financial stability until it effectively reduces its
rampant and infamous corruption. Furthermore, we assert that IMF
conditionality can be used as an effective tool in aiding Argentina in
its struggle to clean up its government.
A. Why Should Corruption Be Important to the IMF?
It may seem odd to call for greater use of conditionality at the
IMF, given the flood of criticism that IMF conditions, especially those
that touch on “structural” considerations, have already received.11
is located in neo-liberal structures of power and policies which facilitated pillage of the economy, massive corruption, and rising foreign debt . . . .").
8. See, e.g., Petras, The Case of Argentina, supra note 7, at 6–7; A Stubborn Curse: Inequality in Latin America, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2003, at 37 ("Historians, political scientists and
left-wingers have long highlighted inequality as an important obstacle to development in Latin
America.").
9. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Take Argentina Off Life Support, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15,
2003, at A9.
10. See, e.g., O'Grady, A Shocking Proposal, supra note 7, at A13 ("[The] International
Monetary Fund should get out of the bailout business and find a new line of work, or better yet,
shut down. . . . What was once supposed to be insurance for developing countries that opened
their capital markets and suffered 'external shocks' beyond their control has turned into a slush
fund for populist big government."); Petras, supra note 7, at 7 ("The immediate cause of the collapse of Argentine capitalism was the role of foreign owned banks and [industrial financial institutions], led by the International Monetary fund (IMF), in emptying the Argentine financial
system.").
11. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text. But see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND (IMF), GUIDANCE ON THE DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION OF IMF CONDITIONALITY:
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Some bemoan the fact that IMF conditions unduly infringe on the
borrower-nation’s sovereignty, and urge the Fund to avoid condition12
ality wherever possible. Others would abandon conditionality for
the simple reason that it is ineffective in imposing any financial disci13
pline. On the other hand, some argue that the IMF’s biggest mistake
has not been its use of conditions, but its unwillingness to insist that
the conditions be strictly followed.14
Without endorsing any specific conditions, we find that conditionality is particularly appropriate when a borrower’s primary problem is not a short-term liquidity crisis, but a deep-rooted flaw in the
fundamentals of its economy.15 It can be argued that the IMF is not
designed to treat such structural societal illnesses.16 But as long as the
Fund chooses to remain at Argentina’s bedside, it would be foolish
for it to perform cosmetic surgery on macroeconomic indicators while
ignoring the underlying cancer of corruption.
Corruption should be important to the IMF because it wastes the
resources of borrower countries, thereby endangering their fiscal position and decreasing their ability to repay their external debts. The
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2002) ("conditionality is indispensable to ensure that IMF
financing goes hand in hand with appropriate policy action by the country receiving that financing"), at http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/053102.pdf (last visited Mar.
19, 2004); Masood Ahmed et al., Refocusing IMF Conditionality, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2001, at 40,
43 (indicating that imposing structural conditionality may be necessary where a country's economic difficulties are caused by more than just fiscal and monetary imbalances).
12. Feldstein, supra note 3, at 27. Feldstein is somewhat supported by the IMF Articles,
which preclude the Fund from basing decisions on a borrower country's political or social
choices. See IMF Articles, art. IV, § 3(b), supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2209, 15 I.L.M. at 549
("[Principles for the guidance of exchange rate policies] shall respect the domestic social and
political policies of members . . . ."); see also IMF Articles, sched. C(4), 29 U.S.T. at 2263, 15
I.L.M. at 580 ("The Fund shall not object [to a proposed par value for a member's currency]
because of the domestic social or political policies of the member proposing the par value.").
13. See Bretton Woods Committee, supra note 5, at 7 (Lerrick states that "[o]fficial conditionality has failed: of Argentina's 19 accords with the IMF, the country did not respect 15.").
14. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 17 (lamenting the IMF's failure "to press the Argentine authorities as hard as it could have and should have to maintain a more prudent fiscal policy").
15. Thus, Feldstein's critique of conditionality, which focused mostly on the IMF's handling
of a short-term liquidity crisis in South Korea, is inapplicable to Argentina, where decades of
economic dreams deferred cannot possibly be attributed to a short-term liquidity problem. See
Feldstein, supra note 3, at 25–27; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 995–96, 1009–10 (2000) (distinguishing sovereign debt crises that arise from shortages of liquidity from crises that have
more fundamental root causes); cf. John H. Chun, "Post-Modern" Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did
Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy Forum?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2659 (1996) (arguing that the Mexican financial crisis of 1994–1995 was caused by liquidity rather than structural problems).
16. See Feldstein, supra note 3, at 20, 30.
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IMF is required to conserve its resources responsibly,17 and therefore
can only extend funding to countries that are reasonably likely to service their loans. When a substantial portion of revenue is wasted on
graft, it becomes more difficult for a government to fulfill all of its
domestic obligations while simultaneously keeping the deficit under
control. In addition, when corruption is uncontrolled, government officials will steal money that had been destined for development, thus
hampering a country’s growth and reducing the future revenue available to service its loans.18
The second justification for IMF involvement in the fight against
corruption stems from the Fund’s duty to monitor its borrowers’
19
monetary policy. Corruption is relevant to monetary policy because
central banks are unlikely to retain autonomy and independence from
the political influence of corrupt regimes. A politicized central bank
will be pressured to lower interest rates in anticipation of elections,

17. Cf. IMF Articles, art. V, § 3(a), supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2211, 15 I.L.M. at 550 ("The
Fund will . . . establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of [its] general resources . . . .").
18. See John Githongo, Corruption as a Problem in the Developing World: Effects on the
Economy and Morale, Address at the Seminar on Corruption and Development Co-operation
held by the Government of Finland (May 2000) ("Corruption is now accepted as a major international scourge that undermines economic, political and social development.") (transcript
available at http://www.transparency.org/speeches/githongo.html (last visited March 19, 2004));
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, pmbl., S. TREATY DOC. NO.
105-39, at 1–2, 35 I.L.M. 724, 727 ("The member states of the Organization of American States,
[are] convinced that corruption . . . strikes at . . . the comprehensive development of peoples . . . ."), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html (last visited Mar.
19, 2004); cf. Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Setting the Stage, in AFTER THE WASHINGTON
CONSENSUS: RESTARTING GROWTH AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 21, 29 (Pedro-Pablo
Kucynski & John Williamson eds., 2003) (noting that development requires substantial public
spending in "productive investment expenditure especially on education and basic infrastructure"); Pedro-Pablo Kucynski, Reforming the State, in id. 33, 34 (noting that in Latin America
"[c]rucial sectors—such as the administration of education, health care, and public infrastructure—suffer from political interference, lack of a career path for civil servants, and pay that is
substantially lower than in comparable private-sector positions” often resulting in a “confrontational attitude toward the private sector—and sometimes corruption and ineptitude").
Mussa implies that Argentina's crisis was caused by a congenital tendency of the government to "spend significantly more than it could raise in taxes." MUSSA, supra note 5, at 10. But
chronic deficits are a hallmark of practically every democracy, since politicians hate to choose
between raising taxes and cutting popular spending programs. See The Red and the Black,
ECONOMIST, May 26, 2001, at 76. Of course, not every democracy suffers from Argentina's repeated financial crises. Perhaps a more accurate explanation for Argentina's dilemma is that
corruption has persistently stunted Argentina's growth, thereby inhibiting the country's ability
to maintain long-term deficits comparable to most democracies.
19. See IMF, GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY 3 (2002) (describing monetary policy as a
"core area of responsibility" for the IMF), at http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/
guid/092302.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
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thereby subjecting the economy to overheating and reducing currency
stability. Furthermore, central bankers beholden to political considerations will be tempted to monetize the fiscal deficit, a solution that
inevitably leads to hyperinflation and financial disaster.20
Some countries, including Argentina, seek to maintain the independence of central banks by enacting laws that forbid the dismissal
of the Central Bank’s governor without cause.21 But when corruption
pervades an entire government, the authorities of the Central Bank
will often be influenced by either outright bribes or more subtle political manipulation. Even if the Central Bank somehow maintains its
integrity, the political leaders who disagree with its policies can easily
find “cause” to effect the governor’s removal.
This is exactly what happened to Pedro Pou, the widely respected former governor of Argentina’s Central Bank. When Pou refused to adopt the policy recommendations of Argentina’s economy
minister, the government conveniently discovered a link between Pou
and certain money-laundering operations and dismissed him.22 The
scandal compromised investors’ already shaky confidence in Argen23
tina’s monetary system. It thus demonstrated that corruption is not
just a “political consideration,” but also a key determinant of a country’s monetary stability, and therefore a legitimate concern for the
IMF. The illicit flow of government funds to the well-connected is often considered the “underlying cause of Argentina’s financial catastrophe.”24 But despite an overwhelming consensus of corruption’s
impact on development, the IMF has afforded little more than lip service to the problem.25
20. See MUSSA, supra note 5, at 20 (noting that printing money to finance deficit spending
had historically caused rapid inflation in Argentina).
21. See id. at 39.
22. See id. Pou may have been guilty, or he may have been the innocent victim of a regime
that was willing and able to go to any lengths to get its way. In either case, Pou's dismissal exemplifies how corruption undermines the independence of central banks. Ironically, the economy minister was himself arrested on corruption charges about a year later. Enter the Scapegoat, ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 2002, at 35.
23. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 39.
24. Matt Moffett, Local Battle: One Tough Mayor Shows Argentina How to Clean House,
WALL ST. J., July 1, 2003, at A1; Celeste Boeri, Note, How to Solve Argentina's Debt Crisis: Will
the IMF's Plan Work?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 245, 250 (2003) ("Argentina is so rife with political
corruption that it can hardly implement its own reforms."); see also supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text; see also IMF, EXPERIMENTAL REPORT
ON TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES: ARGENTINA Box 1 (1999) (noting that the IMF "has not undertaken an assessment of the quality of the data disseminated" by Argentine authorities), at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/arg/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) [hereinafter
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For example, in a postmortem analysis of what went wrong, the
former director of the Department of Research at the IMF writes extensively about Argentina’s macroeconomic conditions but hardly
mentions corruption.26 In other words, when the chief researcher for
Argentina’s largest lender evaluates the reasons for his former client’s
collapse, he focuses on the country’s congenital habit of spending beyond its means, but completely ignores where the money ended up.27
28
Such negligence would be unthinkable for a private lender, and
should not be tolerated in an organization charged with promoting
“development of the productive resources of all members.”29
Of course, it is one thing for the IMF to make the fight against
corruption a priority, and quite another for it to be effective at reducing it. Indeed, we know of no silver bullet for this longstanding and
pervasive problem.30 Nonetheless, we argue that the IMF could effec-

EXPERIMENTAL REPORT]; cf. IMF, STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY IN FUND-SUPPORTED
PROGRAMS 42 (2001) ("[C]hanges in the legal and institutional framework . . . accounted for
less than 10 percent of the structural conditions in transition economies in the second half of the
1990s."). Fortunately, the IMF has recently begun to take corruption more seriously. Last December the Fund refused to bail out the Dominican Republic after it became clear that the government was not committed to addressing the "cronyism, corruption, lax regulation and secrecy" that precipitated a recent banking crisis. Dominican Republic in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2003, at A16 (editorial); see also generally IMF, How Does the IMF Encourage Greater Fiscal
Transparency? (Apr. 2003), at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fiscal.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2004); IMF, GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY, supra note 19, at 2 ("In helping members to
devise economic and financial programs, the Fund will pay due regard to . . . their administrative
capacity to implement reforms."). For more, see generally the EXPERIMENTAL REPORT, supra.
26. See MUSSA, supra note 5, at 9–16; see also Flemming Larsen, Agentina and the IMF:
the need for perspective, Address at the International Cooperation and Solidarity in Latin
America Week, Pôle Universitaire Européen de Toulouse (Nov. 18, 2003) (mentioning "weak
governance" but declining to give the IMF a role in anything other than macroeconomic policy)
(transcript available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/111803.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2004)).
27. Mussa's failure to address corruption is especially glaring in light of the arrest of Domingo Cavallo on corruption charges. See Enter the Scapegoat, supra note 22, at 55. Cavallo
was the renowned architect of Argentina's Convertibility Plan and was one of the key figures
involved in negotiations with the IMF. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 37.
28. To illustrate by way of example, imagine two companies, X and Y, neither of whom
have any assets or liabilities. Thus, both companies have equivalent fiscal situations. Suppose
that both companies approach a bank, B, requesting equivalent loans to finance a new factory,
and that B can only supply one loan. Further suppose that X is likely to succeed in the project
while Y (due to corrupt corporate governance) is likely to have the funds embezzled or otherwise wasted. With all other things being equal, B's resources would be more wisely spent on a
loan to X. But if B focuses only on X and Y's fiscal positions without investigating how they
spend their money, then B will sometimes loan to Y.
29. IMF Articles art. I(ii), supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2205, 15 I.L.M. at 547.
30. See Peter Eigen, Preface to JEREMY POPE, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL SOURCE
BOOK 2000: CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL INTEGRITY
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tively reduce corruption in certain circumstances by adopting the
proposals described below.
B. How Can the IMF Use Conditionality to Reduce Corruption?
The most direct manner in which the IMF could control the finances of its borrowers is by conditioning loan approval on reducing
corruption. However, such an overarching policy would be far more
easily articulated than carried out in practice, as the IMF has neither
the resources nor the mandate to police every dollar of government
31
spending.
Nonetheless, the IMF could at least monitor what John Githongo
describes as “looting, . . . the kind of scams whose figures are so huge
that when they are successfully concluded they have macroeconomic
implications fairly quickly.”32 If the IMF declared that such theft
would be factored into its decision-making process, corrupt leaders
33
might become more hesitant to steal.
The IMF could also use conditionality to control corruption in an
indirect, although perhaps more effective, manner. Namely, it should
condition loan guarantees on the borrower’s disclosure of budgetary
information. The IMF Articles of Agreement require member countries to furnish information on macroeconomic indicators and exchange reserves, but do not demand the publication of government
SYSTEM, at xv (2000) (lamenting that "corruption will . . . always be with us"), http://www.
transparency.org/sourcebook/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
31. Cf. Feldstein supra note 3, at 27 (arguing that even the more limited conditions in use
today unduly infringe on borrowers' sovereignty).
32. See Githongo, supra note 18. Other aid organizations such as the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank may be better suited to police smaller-scale corruption in
the projects they fund. See Eduardo Wills Herrera & Nubia Urueña Cortés, South America, in
TRANSPARENCY INT'L., GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2003, at 103, 104 (Robin Hodess ed.,
2002), http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2003.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). On the
other hand, the World Bank has had trouble policing corruption in practice. See, e.g., infra note
112.
33. Although we call for the IMF to condition loans on making progress in the fight against
corruption, we do not suggest that it give an ultimatum to all borrower countries to clean up or
face an immediate end to all IMF financing. Instead, corruption should be taken into account
among other factors when reviewing a borrower's IMF program. A failure to reduce corruption
need not by itself cut off a country's access to Fund resources, but would be one of several conditions that, if unmet in sufficient numbers, would ultimately doom a country's program. See
IMF, CONDITIONALITY IN FUND-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS—POLICY ISSUES 17 (2001) (discussing the "critical mass" of failed structural benchmarks that could cut off a country from IMF
funding), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/policy/index.htm (last visited Mar.
26, 2004). Such an approach could admittedly be applied in an unpredictable fashion, but it has
the advantage of giving the IMF sufficient flexibility to use conditionality in a way that best suits
each borrower's unique situation.
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budgets.34 In fact, Article VIII specifically forbids the IMF from
compelling members “to furnish information in such detail that the
35
Such selfaffairs of individuals or corporations are disclosed.”
imposed secrecy does nothing to advance the purposes of the IMF,36
and serves only to protect well-connected actors who have something
37
to hide about their incomes.
By demanding disclosure of borrower country spending, the IMF
would help reduce corruption by providing citizens of borrower countries a greater opportunity to scrutinize how their tax money is being
38
spent. Furthermore, if Article VIII were amended, the IMF could
demand that politicians and other high-ranking officials in borrower
countries disclose their personal financial information. Such a move
could substantially increase the accountability and credibility of governments in the developing world.39 And unlike other structural conditions, which depend on the borrower government keeping its promises after coming to an agreement with the IMF, disclosure
requirements could be enforced before any money is disbursed, thus
ensuring a greater level of compliance than is typical for most IMF
programs.

34. See IMF Articles, art. VIII, § 5, supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2224–26, 15 I.L.M. at 558; see
also id., art. IV, § 3(b), 29 U.S.T. at 2209, 15 I.L.M. at 549. In Argentina, the IMF acknowledges
that "coverage of general government transactions . . . is limited, and published information on
extrabudgetary funds, tax expenditures, and contingent liabilities is partial or unavailable."
EXPERIMENTAL REPORT, supra note 25, para. 11.
35. IMF Articles art. VIII, § 5(b), supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2225, 15 I.L.M. at 558.
36. See id. art. I, 29 U.S.T. at 2205, 15 I.L.M. at 547 (outlining the purposes of the IMF).
37. Cf. Eigen, supra note 30, at xv ("The belief that increased transparency can achieve not
only more meaningful levels of accountability, but can do so in a highly cost-effective fashion, is
now expressed universally."); ROBERT MARTIN & ESTELLE FELDMAN, ACCESS TO
INFORMATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 14–19 (1998) (Transparency International working
paper) (advocating access to governmental information generally), available at
http://www.transparency.org/working_papers/martin-feldman/2-why.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2004).
38. Thus, by demanding financial openness, the IMF will be able to utilize the democratic
infrastructures of recipient countries to ensure that conditions which directly require good governance are actually followed. In other words, financial disclosure can ensure that good governance requirements are not reduced to mere surplusage. See supra note 25 (illustrating the IMF's
failure, notwithstanding its rhetoric, to encourage good governance in lender countries) and
AGOA analysis infra (concluding that AGOA's good governance requirement has not been
taken seriously).
39. See POPE, supra note 30, at 235; A Fight Against Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2003,
at A28 ("If public servants must declare their wealth . . . and can be fired if caught lying, they
are deterred from buying a Mercedes or a beach house."). Such conditions would be analogous
to disclosure requirements of certain U.S. federal and state election laws. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-5-50 (2003).
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In recent months the IMF has taken steps in the direction of full
disclosure, and it should be applauded for its efforts. On October 10,
2003, the IMF announced that many country documents would be
presumed publishable unless the country in question objected.40 More
importantly, the Managing Director will recommend that the Board
decline approval of new programs for countries with exceptional access to IMF resources that do not consent to the publication of mate41
These moves will not only improve the efficacy of Fundrial.
supported programs, but they will also boost the credibility of the
IMF as an institution.
Of course, using disclosure and corruption as conditions for IMF
programs is an imperfect solution, subject to numerous criticisms.
For example, some might consider corruption to be too vague a
benchmark to measure in an objective fashion.42 In fact, corruption
has already been measured in a number of ways, such as through
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and as
part of the qualifying criteria for the U.S. government’s Millennium
Challenge Account.43 These indices may not be perfect gauges, but
the same could be said about many of the macroeconomic indicators
44
traditionally used by the IMF. Furthermore, although imperfect statistics may not be appropriate tools for judges to use in deciding questions of law, they are well-suited to constitute factors in the IMF’s
“critical mass” decision-making process.45
Another potential criticism of the use of conditions to fight corruption is that, like all types of structural conditionality, they “substitute [the IMF’s] technical judgments for the outcomes of the nation’s
46
political process.” However, even those who generally oppose struc-

40. IMF Takes Another Step to Increase Its Openness, 32 IMF SURV. 297–98 (2003).
41. Id. at 298. The new policy applies specifically to "Use of Fund Resources" and "Post
Program Monitoring" reports. Id. This suggests a new-found IMF focus on monitoring spending of funds. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
42. This criticism would not apply to disclosure requirements, as the financial information
that must be disclosed could easily be delineated in advance.
43. See Press Release, Transparency Int'l, Nine out of Ten Developing Countries Urgently
Need Practical Support to Fight Corruption, Highlights New Index 2–3 (Oct. 7, 2003),
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html (last visited Mar.
26, 2004); Lael Brainard, The Millennium Challenge Account & Foreign Assistance, BROOKINGS
REV., Spring 2003, at 42.
44. See, e.g., IRVIN B. TUCKER, MACROECONOMICS FOR TODAY 126–28 (2000) (questioning the value of GDP as a measurement of a nation's income).
45. See supra note 33.
46. See Feldstein, supra note 3, at 27.
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tural conditionality47 might accept our proposals because, for the following reasons, they do not suffer from the same deficiencies as other
structural conditions.
First, many IMF structural conditions are assailed for being in48
fluenced by some kind of ideological bias. In contrast, conditions relating to corruption are ideologically neutral. They do not tell a government how much money it should spend, or what its spending
priorities should be. Their only aim is to ensure that public spending
be applied for the public good and not for some official’s personal
gain.
In addition, IMF conditions have often pitted the Fund against
its borrowers’ populations—the very people whom the IMF purports
49
to help. Yet IMF action against corruption would probably elicit far
more popular support, since corruption is a scourge that is over50
whelmingly condemned the world over. Moreover, disclosure requirements are unlikely to engender popular opposition, because they
do not require popular sacrifice.51
Some conditions have been criticized for depriving a borrower
country of “ownership” of its economic agenda, thereby dooming any
Fund program to failure. In other words, IMF programs that do not
have the support of the borrower government are unlikely to be fully
implemented no matter what carrots or sticks the Fund offers to secure compliance.52 But conditions that decrease corruption will only

47. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
48. The accusations have come from both the Left and the Right. See supra notes 7–9 and
accompanying text for a selection of IMF critiques from all sides of the political spectrum.
Though the authors are often directly at odds with each other on substance, they all tend to accuse the IMF of being biased towards either the Left or the Right. Conditions that are vulnerable to charges of ideological bias include IMF-influenced privatizations, tax increases, deregulation of industry and of capital controls, and austerity measures.
49. See, e.g., Eliseo Gardel, No llores por FMI Argentina [Don't cry for the IMF,
Argentina], at http://www.nodo50.org/patrialibre/sifuturo/argentina.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2003); Richard H. Robbins, Anti-IMF/World Bank Protests in the Global South 1976-2001 (a
partial list), at http://faculty.plattsburgh.edu/richard.robbins/legacy/Anti-IMF%20Protests%
201976-2001.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
50. Eigen, supra note 30, at xix (noting "the degree of public outrage that has accompanied
the fall" of corrupt leaders and dismissing the notion that "corruption is a matter of 'culture'").
The IMF can also improve the popularity of corruption-related conditions by involving elements
of local civil society, such as Poder Ciudadano in Argentina. See generally Poder Ciudadano
website (select link to "Relaciones Internationales"), at http://www.poderciudadano.org.ar (last
visited Dec. 18, 2003).
51. Of course, they may end up requiring (long overdue) sacrifices from corrupt leaders.
52. See Allan Drazen, Conditionality & Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy
Approach, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 36, 40 (2002).
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improve a country’s ownership of its program, because a government
with less corruption is naturally more responsive to the public rather
than to the unknown and unpredictable demands of those who purchase influence.
Finally, the requirement that governments disclose their expenditures may be seen as too intrusive on a sovereign’s prerogative to
keep state secrets. In light of the horrifying recent histories of some
of the recipients of IMF aid, one might question the wisdom of allowing any kind of secrecy in such governments.53 Nevertheless, as long
as the United States and other developed countries continue to harbor state secrets, it would be difficult to require absolute openness
from the developing world. Here, the IMF could compromise between state sovereignty and the need for governmental transparency
by allowing recipient countries to designate a small percentage of
their expenditures as classified. At the same time, a borrower country’s right to limited secrecy would not compromise the duty of government officials to report all sources of personal income. Thus, corrupt leaders would have little room to hide illicit payoffs under the
guise of national security.
II. INTRODUCTION TO AGOA
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),54 passed by
the U.S. Congress as part of the Trade and Development Act of
55
2000, has been heralded as providing sub-Saharan African states
with unprecedented benefits and opportunities.56 AGOA offers re53. For example, in Argentina an estimated 10,000 people were killed by clandestine military squads during the nation's "dirty war" of the 1970s and 1980s. Hector Tobar, Revolution
Was One of Their 3 Rs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2003, at A1.
54. African Growth and Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3747 (2000) [hereinafter
AGOA].
55. Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000) (codified throughout 19 U.S.C. (2000)) [hereinafter Trade and Development Act].
56. See The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, S. HRG. NO. 108-187, at 8 (2003) (prepared statement of Florizelle B. Liser,
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa) ("AGOA is . . . stimulating economic growth,
helping sub-Saharan Africa integrate into the global economy, increasing opportunities for U.S.
exports and businesses, supporting African reforms, and encouraging a solid U.S.-Africa trade
partnership."), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_
senate_hearings&docid=f:90449.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter AGOA Foreign
Relations Hearing]; see also 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH
AND OPPORTUNITY ACT, THIRD OF EIGHT ANNUAL REPORTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 108-74, at 4, 7
(2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003agoa.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2004) ("U.S.
imports under AGOA were valued at $9 billion in 2002, a 10 percent increase from 2001.")
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forming sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the U.S.
market, covering 1,800 items in addition to the 4,600 products contained under the General System of Preferences (GSP) offered to
other developing countries.57
The president is required to certify AGOA-candidate countries
annually.58 The determinative eligibility criteria demand that a country “has established, or is making continual progress toward establishing,” inter alia,
(A) a market-based economy that protects private property
rights; . . .
(B) the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due process, a fair trial, and equal protection under the law; . . .
(C) the elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment[, including national treatment of foreign investors and the
protection of intellectual property rights;]
(D) economic policies to reduce poverty, increase the availability
of health care and educational opportunities; . . .
(E) a system to combat corruption and bribery[; and] . . .
(F) protection of internationally recognized worker rights, including the right of association, [and] the right to organize and bargain
59
collectively.

Additionally, AGOA’s conditions stipulate that the president is authorized to designate a country eligible only if it “does not engage in
activities that undermine United States national security or foreign
policy interests;” and “does not engage in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or provide support for acts of international terrorism and cooperates in international efforts to eliminate
human rights violations and terrorist activities.”60
This long list of eligibility criteria identifies many of the most
pervasive problems of the region, where the vestiges of colonialism
and subsequent misadministration still manifest themselves in “continuing conflict in some countries and regions, weak institutions and
leadership, disunity among racial, linguistic, religious, and tribal

[hereinafter 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT]. About seventy-five percent of the imports are
petroleum products. Id. at 18.
57. See William Cline, Trading Up: Strengthening AGOA's Development Potential, CTR.
FOR GLOBAL DEV. BRIEF, June 2003, at 3, at http://www.cgdev.org/docs/cgdbrief6.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
58. AGOA § 106.
59. Id. § 104.
60. Id. § 104(2)–(3).
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groups, corruption, and poor governance.”61 Consequently, while
many sub-Saharan African countries have made enormous progress
toward more open and democratic political systems, the region still
lags behind the rest of the world in virtually every category of devel62
opment. Thus, in light of the numerous conditions, it might come as
a surprise that thirty-eight of forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries were certified under AGOA in 2003.63 Only seven countries
were deemed ineligible in 2003, and three countries did not apply for
64
participation in the program. As of January 2004, two countries
were removed from the list (Central African Republic and Eritrea),
65
while Angola was added by presidential proclamation.
A. The Apparel Provision
A widely criticized element of AGOA is in fact not a formal
condition, but rather a provision related to the export of apparel
products to the United States. Unlimited duty-free exports of textiles
and apparels are allowed only if they are produced with American
66
raw materials. Currently, due to market conditions, many apparel
producers in sub-Saharan Africa receive their yarns from outside the

61. BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. RECORD 2002–2003, at 11, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
62. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
INDEX REVEALS DEVELOPMENT CRISIS, in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, at 4E1
(2003) ("Almost all of the 'low human development countries' at the bottom of the Index are in
sub-Saharan Africa: 30 out of a total of 34."), http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/presskit
/HDR03_PR4E.pdf (last visited June 30, 2004); see also FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE
WORLD 2003: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 11 (2003)
(reporting that only 11 African countries can be considered "free") [hereinafter FREEDOM
HOUSE 2003].
63. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 1.
64. See generally Results of the AGOA Country Review for 2003 Eligibility, at
http://www.agoa.gov/2003_eligibility_results.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
65. See Proclamation 7748, 69 Fed. Reg. 227, 228 (Jan. 2, 2004).
66. AGOA § 112. Apparel made from fabrics originating in other AGOA countries may
also be exported duty-free to the United States, but must not exceed a cap set by the U.S.
government, which was recently raised to 3 percent of all U.S. imports and will rise to 7 percent
by 2008 under AGOA II. See Cline, supra note 57, at 4. A temporary apparel exception for
least developed countries, allowing imports into the U.S. regardless of the origin of the yarn,
will expire in September 2004. Cline, supra note 57, at 3; see also AADITYA MATTOO ET AL.,
THE AFRICA GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT AND ITS RULES OF ORIGIN: GENEROSITY
UNDERMINED? 7–8 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2908, 2002),
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/20742_wps2908.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
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continent, often from Asia.67 As a result, “the rules of origin requirements in the apparel sector . . . will significantly reduce exports
68
below [sub-Saharan Africa’s] full potential.”
The rule-of-origin provisions are, however, not the only problem
pertaining to apparel products. In order to export duty-free apparel
into the United States, sub-Saharan African countries must obtain a
69
“visa” issued by the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
This visa requires countries to modernize domestic laws and institute
highly technical administrative and enforcement procedures to prevent the unlawful transshipment of articles and the use of counterfeit
documents and products.70 Due to the weak technical capacity of
most sub-Saharan African countries, only nineteen of the thirty-eight
71
AGOA countries have obtained this visa certification.
B. Importance of Foreign Investment
Additionally, the president has the authority to suspend dutyfree apparel imports if they “cause serious damage, or threat thereof”
72
to the domestic U.S. industry. While the provision has not yet been
invoked, it is indicative of a fundamental structural flaw of the re73
gime. This imbalance of power, allowing the president to revoke
67. Currently, due to market conditions, many apparel producers in sub-Saharan Africa
receive their yarns from outside the continent, often in Asia. See, e.g., Helmo Preuss, SA Has
Not Used AGOA to Best Advantage (Sept. 9, 2003), at http://business.iafrica.com
/features/269064.htm ("Clothing manufacturers cannot source all the fabric they need from
South African textile producers. That means they cannot expand their exports to the US due to
the stringent rules of origin.") (last visited June 30, 2004).
68. MATTOO ET AL., supra note 66, at 17. Without the apparel exports rule, the volume of
African exports into the United States would be five times higher. Id.
69. Trade and Development Act § 113(1)(A).
70. Id.; see also AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 28 (prepared statement of Stephen Hayes, President, Corporate Council on Africa) ("[M]any of Africa's small
businesses are confronted with a myriad of confusing and complicated standards imposed upon
them by their own governments as they seek to comply with AGOA visa provisions. It would
be useful for the U.S. government to work more closely with national customs agencies in Africa to find ways to explain better and/or simplify the AGOA certification requirements for African small and medium businesses.").
71. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 9. As a result of the visa requirement, only 38 percent of apparel from AGOA countries was exported to the U.S. duty-free
in 2001. Cline, supra note 57, at 3.
72. AGOA § 112 (b)(3)(C)(ii).
73. The World Trade Organization, via the so-called Enabling Clause, permits developed
countries to offer unilateral non-reciprocal preferential treatment to products originating from
developing countries under the General System of Preferences (GSP). Arrangements such as
AGOA go beyond the traditional GSP, in that they attach specific conditions as a prerequisite
for developing countries receiving the GSP benefits. As AGOA is effectively a GSP+ system, it
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benefits unilaterally, injects uncertainty into potential investors’ plans
74
to become active in sub-Saharan Africa. AGOA is scheduled to expire in 2008, and thus any long-term investor will likely hesitate to
expend a large amount of capital in a country that may not see preferential market access at the end of the decade.75 In fact, the lack of
foreign direct investment under AGOA has been identified as a major disappointment.76 A World Bank study expresses the view that increases in foreign investment are central to the economic growth of
77
sub-Saharan Africa. The authors found that open market access
alone without accompanying foreign investment will result in a mere
0.4% increase in non-oil exports and hardly any change in the welfare
of sub-Saharan African countries.78
In light of this data, it comes as no surprise that AGOA aims to
79
facilitate foreign investment in the region. The U.S. government has
numerous tools at its disposal to induce investment, many of which
80
are underutilized at best. Yet even the best efforts to urge corporations to invest abroad can only be negligible compared to the importance of an attractive climate on the ground. No rational investor will
throw his money down the metaphorical bottomless pit. In the words
of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “[c]apital is a coward. It flees
does not include reciprocal obligations on its members. Unlike a bilateral or multilateral freetrade agreement, which imposes mutual rights and duties on its parties, the unilateral nature of
AGOA lets both the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the "benefactor," the
United States, off the hook. The performance conditionality inherent in such GSP+ programs
has recently been struck down by a WTO Panel in a case brought by India against the European
Communities (EC). The EC has appealed the Panel decision, which could potentially mark the
end of conditionality in programs such as AGOA or the EU's Contonou Agreement.
74. Cf. Cline, supra note 57, at 4 (arguing AGOA be reformed to grant qualifying African
nations assured eligibility for five years, allowing for presidential revocation only in "extreme
circumstances, such as when a government has been deposed by force").
75. Several members of Congress have urged an extension of AGOA benefits, and President Bush has indicated his support to extend AGOA beyond 2008. See, e.g., Jim FisherThompson, U.S. Lawmaker Calls for an AGOA III at Mauritius Forum, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. INT'L
INFO. PROGRAMS, Jan. 17, 2003, at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/trade/a3011701.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
76. See AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 26–27 (prepared statement of
Stephen Hayes).
77. See generally ELENA IANCHOVICHINA ET AL., UNRESTRICTED MARKET ACCESS FOR
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: HOW MUCH IS IT WORTH AND WHO PAYS? (World Bank Development Research Group Paper 2001), at http://www.eldis.org/ static/doc9124.htm (last visited May
24, 2004).
78. See id. at 2. The study bemoans the "neglect of investment" in the region. Id. at 22.
79. AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 26 (prepared statement of Stephen
Hayes) ("[T]he act is intended to serve as an investment tool for U.S. companies seeking African partners.")
80. Id. at 10.
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war. It flees disease. It won’t go near corruption.”81 Unstable governments, pervasive nepotism, lack of judicial independence, human
rights abuses, non-transparent political and economic processes, unsatisfactory intellectual property protection, and the ever-present
threat of violent upheaval and conflict present seemingly insurmountable obstacles to increased investment.82 Therefore, conditions aimed
at improving those realities are necessary and entirely consistent with
AGOA’s purpose of promoting political and economic reform and
development.
C. 2003 AGOA Country Report Analysis
Most sub-Saharan countries have performed neither brilliantly
nor awfully vis-à-vis AGOA eligibility and must therefore be analyzed with great scrutiny. The records of a few states, though, are so
obvious that they speak for themselves. Two examples on opposite
sides of the spectrum are Botswana and Liberia. Botswana, despite
being the country with the highest HIV/AIDS infection rate in the
world, boasts a great record on transparent, democratic governance
and offers not only universal health care and anti-retroviral therapy
to all of its AIDS patients, but also receives strong marks on respect
for human rights and labor rights.83 Economically, it maintains a
highly stable market economy and financial policy, for which it re84
ceived a Standard & Poor’s “A” credit rating. It is arguably the least
corrupt country in Africa and has correctly been rewarded with
AGOA eligibility, including textile and apparel benefits.85
Liberia is on the other end of the spectrum. A repressive, warmongering political leadership has enriched itself and brought death
and misery to its own citizens and its neighbors, fueling conflicts in
Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire. Human rights are seemingly nonexistent, a formal economic system has collapsed, and despite President Taylor’s departure, the country remains far from securing a sustainable peace.86
81. Zachary Goldfarb, Powell Urges Ending African Corruption, WASH. TIMES, June 28,
2003, at A7.
82. See AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 29 (prepared statement of Stephen Hayes) ("The nations of Africa themselves clearly have a major responsibility in creating
the economic and political climate necessary for business investment.").
83. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 71–72.
84. Id. at 71.
85. Id. (noting that five Botswanan firms are exporting textiles under AGOA).
86. See generally David White, U.S. Pullout from Liberia Raises Security Concerns, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct 1, 2003, at 10 ("[The] country remains divided into three, controlled by
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Evaluating AGOA eligibility for Botswana or Liberia is easy. In
most other cases, though, the picture is less clear. Four examples—
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, and Eritrea—serve as an illustration
of the reprehensibly cynical manner in which the U.S. government
applies AGOA’s criteria to countries that have received less media
attention.
87
Burkina Faso failed to obtain AGOA eligibility in 2003. Yet,
the U.S. government’s official evaluation is full of praise for recent
political developments in this West African state. It applauds the
country’s market reforms and good governance, which includes de88
mocratic elections and a severe reduction of corruption and poverty.
In fact, Burkina Faso has been the recipient of IMF loans as part of
its poverty reduction strategy and has graduated from “Highly Indebted Poor Country” status.89 Additionally, the report deems Burkina Faso “helpful on terrorism.”90 The widely acclaimed evaluation
by Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that rates countries’ respect for political and civil liberties, also applauds recent developments in Burkina Faso.91 Freedom House reports that “gains
92
have been made in life expectancy, literacy, and school attendance.”
Furthermore, “Burkina Faso has a vibrant free press, and freedom of
speech is protected by the constitution and generally respected in
practice.”93 Religious freedom and labor union rights receive protection, as observed by the many human rights groups that operate freely
in the country.94 It would thus appear that Burkina Faso meets the
stated conditions of AGOA. However, because of its alleged involvement in the rebel insurgency in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire and
arms shipments to Liberia, the U.S. government declined to certify its
95
eligibility for AGOA in 2003.

former government militias and two rebel movements. Aid and human rights organisations report continued harassment and abuse of civilians in all three sectors, including widespread rape
and extortion by armed bands.").
87. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 72.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 114 (labeling Burkina Faso "partly free" and
giving the country an "upward trend arrow due to the holding of legislative elections that were
more free and fair than in previous years").
92. Id.
93. Id. at 115.
94. See id.
95. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 72.
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It is illuminating to compare Burkina Faso to countries admitted
into the AGOA club. For example, Cameroon continues to face in96
ternal political challenges. The government rules an undemocratic,
de facto one-party state and frequently obstructs political meetings
97
and harasses journalists. Freedom House agrees, noting that “elections in 2002 . . . were no more free and fair than previous polls.”98
The judiciary is “ineffective and subject to political influence and cor99
ruption.” The government has failed to stop forced and child labor,
and “has ignored agreements after entering into them with unions,”
thereby precluding any formal collective bargaining from taking place
since 1996.100 Most dramatically, “[t]he U.S. Secretary of State has
expressed concerns to the government about the arrest, arbitrary detention, harsh treatment and torture of opposition politicians, human
rights activists, and other citizens. There are credible reports that security forces committed extra-judicial killings.”101
Despite this condemning indictment of Cameroon’s political and
human rights policies, the country is eligible for AGOA, including
102
To explain this outcome, one must
textiles and apparel benefits.
look to economics. In 2002, Cameroon exported duty-free products
103
worth $116 million to the United States—overwhelmingly oil. The
country receives high marks on its treatment of international inves104
It has engaged in extensive privatization of formerly statetors.
owned production, including the sale of its power utility to a U.S.
corporation.105 Most importantly, it is host to the United States’
“largest investment in sub-Saharan Africa,” the Chad-Cameroon
106
Thus, the plausible explanation for Cameroon’s
pipeline project.

96. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 127. The report ranks Cameroon in its 2003
country report as "not free." Id.
97. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 74–75.
98. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 127.
99. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 75 ("The judiciary is regarded as ineffective and subject to political influence and corruption.").
100. Id. at 75.
101. Id.; see also FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 128 (reporting that Amnesty International called for investigations into dozens of extra-judicial executions).
102. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 74.
103. Id.
104. Id. However, the USTR also notes that, "[f]oreign investors have sometimes found it
difficult to obtain enforcement of their legal rights." Id. at 74.
105. Id. Additionally, it has granted a cobalt mining concession to a U.S. firm. Id.
106. Emmanuel Tumanjong, First Crude Shipped in West Africa Project, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 5, 2003, at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/news/press_coverage_1003.pdf (last
visited May 5, 2004). Although the project is carried out under the auspices of the World Bank,
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admission lies in the narrow-minded attempt by the U.S. government
to secure a continually welcoming investment climate for U.S. corporate entities, as part of its strategy to become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil.
Chad could be called Cameroon’s twin brother, for the abuses
committed by its government are equally serious.107 Chad’s progress
toward political pluralism and the rule of law are deemed “disappointing,” with its presidential elections of 1996 and 2001 marked by
irregularities and fraud.108 Anticorruption laws are not enforced, and
109
the judiciary is the victim of frequent executive interference.
Chad’s human rights record is appalling. There is widespread evidence of arbitrary and prolonged detention, extra-judicial killings,
torture, beatings and rape committed by government agents.110 While
unions ostensibly have the right to organize, they are subject to government interference, and participation in strikes is punishable by
imprisonment with forced labor.111 Despite the country’s slow progress on privatization, it was nevertheless approved for AGOA.
Again, the most likely explanation is the prestigious Chad-Cameroon
oil pipeline project and the Bush administration’s attempt to protect
the U.S. corporate interests involved.112
Eritrea is another compelling example. Applying the explicit
AGOA criteria, this small East African nation by the Red Sea falls
113
short on the political, economic, and human rights fronts. In 2002,
two U.S. oil corporations are major stakeholders, namely ExxonMobile with 40 percent and
ChevronTexaco with 25 percent. Id.
107. Elizabeth Becker, World Bank Inaugurates Oil Pipeline in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 3,
2003, at W1. Becker also notes, "Chad and Cameroon are failing on environmental, social and
poverty alleviation grounds." Id. at W7.
108. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 78. See also FREEDOM HOUSE 2003,
supra note 62, at 135 (characterizing Chad as "not free").
109. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 78.
110. Id. Freedom House agrees. It admonishes that "[s]ecurity forces routinely ignore constitutional protections regarding search, seizure, and detention. Overcrowding, disease, and
malnutrition make prison conditions life threatening, and many inmates spend years in prison
without charges." FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 137.
111. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 78.
112. The Chad government's priorities are evidenced by its initial use of the money it received for the pipeline project. "Embarrassed World Bank officials have already admitted that
the notoriously corrupt Chad government has spent the first [10 million pounds] of grant money
it received from the consortium on arms for its security forces rather than on the educational
and development projects for which the money was intended." Paul Brown, Chad Oil Pipeline
Condemned for Harming the Poor, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 27, 2002, at 15.
113. See, e.g., Dan Connell, Redeeming the Failed Promise of Eritrea, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
10, 2003, at A17 ("[W]ith the Asmara government refusing to implement the Constitution, postponing national elections, arresting critics, shutting down the independent press, and banning
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the government “continued its repressive policy of allowing neither
opposition nor independent organizations in the political or civil
114
sphere.” The U.S. government bemoans the dictatorship’s tendency
to shut down the independent press and arrest journalists and political dissidents, who are often held in prison without any charges or
prospects for trial.115 While Eritrea has the formal structures of a
market economy and has started to lower tariff barriers, it currently
provides no intellectual property protection and has been instituting
economic reforms very slowly.116 Eritrea’s “poor human rights record
worsened in 2002,”117 as the “government has maintained a hostile attitude towards civil society and has refused international assistance
118
designed to support the development of pluralism in society.” The
accumulation of these realities has brought Eritrea the dubious distinction of being featured in a special report to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, as one of the “World’s Most Repressive Regimes.”119
Unlike Chad or Cameroon, Eritrea conducts almost no trade
with the United States.120 So why might the Bush administration be
interested in awarding Eritrea the status of AGOA membership? As
part of the global war on terrorism, Eritrea suddenly has achieved
great strategic importance as the United States is expanding its military presence in the Horn of Africa. It has hosted several visits by
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the U.S. military

rival parties, the country's trajectory follows a familiar path toward highly coercive one-man
rule.").
114. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 198. Eritrea received a "not free" rating. In
its international relations, "Eritrea's aggressive foreign policy has contributed significantly to
regional instability." Id. at 199.
115. See, e.g., Frank Smyth, U.S.'s New Friend Could Pose Problems, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2002, at B5 ("Until recently, U.S. military ties with Eritrea were restricted
because of the crackdown on civil liberties. In October, the State Department raised human
rights concerns on the anniversary of the jailing of two of its Eritrean employees . . . . The Eritrean government is not known to have filed charges against any prisoner . . . . Meanwhile, the
government's allegations that they were part of a foreign-backed plot remain unsubstantiated.").
116. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 84.
117. Id.; see also Rory Carroll, Eritrean Children Locked Up For Having Bibles, Says Amnesty, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 20, 2003, at 20.
118. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, 199.
119. See generally FREEDOM HOUSE, THE WORLD'S MOST REPRESSIVE REGIMES 2003, 27–
30 (2003), at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/mrr2003.pdf (last visited May 24, 2004).
120. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 83. ("[E]xports in 2002 were negligible. No new U.S. investment was reported.").
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commander for the Middle East, General Tommy Franks.121 Eritrea’s
government was part of the “coalition of the willing” in the Iraq war
and is offering base rights to the U.S. military, arguably “to woo the
Bush administration into ignoring its repressive measures.”122 By certifying its eligibility for AGOA, the U.S. government is “propping up
this repressive regime as a Cold War–style political payoff for joining
the ‘war on terrorism.’”123
Ultimately, as of January 2004, the U.S. government withdrew
AGOA membership from Eritrea. Because Eritrea’s performance
did not improve throughout 2003, the USTR finally pulled the plug
and expelled Eritrea.124 While this step is laudable, it does not alter
the underlying analysis—the acceptance of a country for AGOA
merely out of strategic foreign policy reasons, without regard for the
conditions aimed at genuine political and economic reform.
CONCLUSION
Although the IMF has little in common with AGOA, both regimes could substantially improve their ability to help developing
countries by applying conditionality consistently with their official
rhetoric and objectives.125 To improve AGOA, the U.S. government
should rigorously enforce the Act’s articulated criteria. In theory,
AGOA’s conditions supply countries with an attractive carrot, by
providing them with beneficial market access as a consequence of
their own policy choices—or a hurtful stick, by excluding them from
beneficial market access as a consequence of their own policy choices.
In reality, the current certification process makes a mockery of those
conditions and undermines the credibility and reputation of the U.S.
government’s efforts in Africa and beyond.
It appears as if not all conditions are created equal, or perhaps
some are more equal than others. In particular, demands for political
pluralism, the protection of civil, human, and worker’s rights, and the
fight against corruption—those conditions that primarily benefit do-

121. Smyth, supra note 115, at B5.
122. Connell, supra note 113, at A17.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 65.
125. In the case of AGOA, the U.S. government should also waive the harmful rule-oforigin requirement and substantially increase funding for technical trade capacity building of the
region. Since 1999, the U.S. government has only provided a meager $345 million for that purpose. See AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 26 (prepared statement of Stephen Hayes).
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mestic populations in sub-Saharan Africa—often take a back-seat to
strategic interests of the U.S. government and U.S. investors.
The rationale behind the AGOA conditions demanding political
and economic reform is plausible and positive, as such changes will
ideally result in more international economic transactions, more
transparent and democratic governance, and in better lives for subSaharan Africans. Unfortunately, a secondary condition which
126
blandly refers to “foreign policy interests” is being abused in an entirely self-serving manner. The U.S. government is effectively displaying schizophrenic and distasteful behavior: it enforces only those
conditions that are in its immediate self-interest and in the process
tolerates and rewards governance standards which AGOA sets out to
discourage.
While the primary conditions speak to a wide array of political,
economic, social, judicial, and human development, the certification
scheme is directed and authored by one single agency within the U.S.
government bureaucracy, the Office of the United States Trade Representative. Unsurprisingly, the result is an undue emphasis on economic interests, at the expense of conditions focused on political pluralism, democracy, health, education, and human rights. A broader
and more formal interagency process, incorporating high-level representatives from relevant State Department offices, the Treasury Department, the Agency for International Development, and the National Security Council, might produce a more balanced evaluation
127
mechanism. Beyond instituting these structural improvements, the
U.S. government must resist the temptation to use AGOA in a selfish
manner. It must remember that AGOA is intended to be a device to
encourage sub-Saharan African governments to pursue policies that
will positively affect the well-being and development of their own
people.128
In contrast, the IMF’s shortcomings stem not from selfish motives but from an institutional failure to look beyond basic macroeconomic figures in order to examine the long-term causes of its clients’
economic woes. In particular, the IMF should include corruption and

126. AGOA § 104(2).
127. Currently, to determine country eligibility, the USTR chairs the Subcommittee of the
Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC). The Committee receives information from U.S. embassies, U.S. government agencies, and other public comments that have been posted to the Federal Register. While it formally resembles interagency meetings, the eligibility results suggest a
lack of sufficient input form other departments and agencies.
128. See AGOA § 103.
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transparency in governance as important factors in its funding decisions. Since corruption is inversely related to a country’s long-term
fiscal and monetary stability, greater IMF involvement in the struggle
for transparency in government would comport with the Fund’s mis129
sion. In fact, the IMF’s official rhetoric already acknowledges that
the institution should play a role in fighting corruption.130 Unfortunately, the decision-makers at the Fund have not acted consistently
with their rhetoric, but have allowed corruption to take a back seat to
more superficial and short-term macroeconomic concerns.
We are not arguing that the beneficiary countries of IMF and
AGOA should meet unattainable goals. We recognize that AGOA’s
131
eligibility standard is “making continual progress” toward complying with the conditions, not constructing a postmodern liberal democracy overnight. Yet, when countries undoubtedly make “continual
regress” they must be denied AGOA benefits. All that is required is
a basic consistency and honesty in the interpretation of the U.S.
Trade Representative–authored country reports.
Similarly, we do not believe that the IMF should suspend payments as soon as corruption is found, but only that corruption should
be treated as a genuine factor in the Fund’s decision-making process.
Financial disclosure requirements on borrower countries (and on
their government officials) would send a clear message to corrupt regimes that actions have consequences. The recent scandal involving
132
Argentina’s former economy minister Cavallo affirms the popular
view that the IMF does nothing to prevent the very officials with
whom it negotiates from robbing their country blind. Taking a more
active role in the fight against corruption would prove beneficial to
the IMF and its clients: it would enhance the Fund’s sullied reputation, and improve transparency and accountability in borrower governments.133 Thus, the Fund would contribute more effectively to its
clients’ development, and in the process decrease the risk of default.
David Fuhr & Zachary Klughaupt

129. See IMF Articles, supra note 1, art. I. See also IMF, REVISED CODE OF GOOD
PRACTICES ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (2001), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/
code.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004).
130. See also supra note 25.
131. AGOA § 104.
132. See supra note 27.
133. The Fund's recent actions in the Dominican Republic are a welcome step in the right
direction. See Dominican Republic in Crisis, supra note 25, at A16.

